European Union military operations and global security: ambitions and reality

Operações Militares da União Europeia e a segurança global: ambições e realidade

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the 1990s and with the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union (EU) has striven for recognition as an important security actor. For this reason, peace operations have emerged as a pragmatic response to the security challenges that the EU has faced since the end of Cold War. Tasks set by the Petersberg Declaration (1992) defined the spectrum of military actions and functions that the EU could undertake within its operations. These tasks were expanded upon by the Treaty of Lisbon and include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance, conflict-prevention and peacekeeping, and combatting forces in crisis management (EU 2007). The Headline Goals were developed with the aim of building the capacity to respond to crisis management tasks (Council of the EU 2004). In light of these goals, specific policies, strategies, structures, decision-making and financing procedures, and legal and operational tools have been built to guide the EU's peace operations.

Between 2003 and 2020, the EU established thirty-six missions and operations across twenty countries, of which twenty-three were civilian missions and thirteen military operations/missions. Of the sixteen peace operations ongoing in 2020, six were military operations/missions and ten were civilian missions (EEAS 2021).

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This paper aims to answer the following, fundamental question — *what is the true nature of EU military operations?* Despite the fact that focusing on military operations/missions excludes other ways the EU might engage internationally (including through civilian missions) it is a useful unit of analysis from which to evaluate the reality of the EU as an international security actor. By EU definitions, operations are military interventions with an executive mandate, while missions are either military interventions with non-executive mandates or civilian CSDP interventions (Council of the EU 2014b). This paper uses the term 'peace operation' to encompass all military missions and operations that the EU has been undertaken (and which they refer to referred by the EU as crisis management operations).

The literature on this topic is diverse. EU overseas activities have sparked debates around their identity, power, and level of global engagement, among other things. Thomas (2012) brings together the concepts of policy determinacy (mandates that define the missions and roles of member states) and political cohesion (member states that support the agreement) to define EU coherence. Meanwhile, Palm and Crum (2019) work on how military operations have evolved over time and how this has affected the character of the EU as an international actor, which they explore through the dimensions of justification (the purpose of military operations), and policy-embeddedness (the coordination between military action and other foreign policy instruments). Peters (2016), on the other hand, focuses on the specific features of EU 'actorness and power' to identify the distinguishing features of EU foreign policy and evaluate their 'effectiveness'.

The paper is descriptive-exploratory; it lays the groundwork for further research. To understand the situation of EU military operations and missions implemented to date, I describe the phenomenon and its different characteristics based on data acquired from primary and secondary sources. Quantitative and qualitative data were combined using proxies to identify the nature of EU military operations/missions from input to impact. The model includes perceptions and intentions, their translation into effective implementation, and their impact. The paper discusses the period between 2003, when the first military operation was deployed, and 2019, when the necessary data became available. The first section presents the methodological framework. The next section presents the data on the implementation of EU military operations/missions. The last section concludes.

THE MODEL OF ANALYSIS

EU military operations and missions rely on the individual motivations, perceptions, and interests of member states that provide the most resources (personnel, materials, and funding) for the deployment and maintenance of operations. As such, the EU's role in the field of security cannot be understood without taking into account the inputs it received to carry out operations/missions on the ground in the first place. Ingo Peters (2016, 27–8) provides a model for tracing effectiveness across the foreign policy process. According to the model, effectiveness includes indicators for policy formulation, implementation, and results. Policy formulation is measured by "the quality of the formulation of goals and the unity of voice", i.e. the degree to which "actors consider institutions and agencies advantageous or even indispensable for translating decisions into actions" (determinacy). The quality of policy implementation was measured by outcome effectiveness, e.g., by the resonance between stated goals and actions taken (cohesion). Policy results involve the mission's ability to resolve the problems identified in mandates and the impact this had on the overseas actors targeted (change in behaviour). Peter's model provides a useful framework for identifying the nature of EU military operations/ missions from input to impact. From his model, I defined proxies which were used to shape data collection and analysis.

Graphic 1 — The model of analysis.

The input was determined according to context (civil war, political crisis, or as part of a broader peace operation), what motivated the EU's

action (EU collective interest, member State interest, other international organisation request, host country request, etc.), and the geographic scope through which the operations/missions were deployed. The main sources were Council joint acts, and decisions and UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

The way the EU designs and carries out its military operations and missions depends on the degree of intergovernamental cooperation. The EU decision-making process constitutes a constant struggle to reconcile diverging national interests in which negotiations often reflect relative bargaining power. The intergovernmentalist approach attributes the difficulty of reaching consensus to governments' commitment to their own domestic interests (e.g. Bellamy and Weale 2015), especially when government preferences are the result of competition between domestic interest groups (Rothacher 2015). Other studies are less certain about the relationship between domestic group interests and government preferences (e.g. Schafer 2016), demonstrating that influence is limited in certain circumstances (e.g. Moravcsik 2018), or that member states' preferences are determined instead by cost distribution and burden-sharing considerations (Schimmelfennig 2015). While the realist approach assumes that governments are driven by clearly defined win-sets and instrumental rationality (Crespy and Schmidt 2014), there is always the chance that politicians might be more committed to EU consensus than they are to other objectives (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015). In defence situations "where national preferences are heterogeneous and the EU's legal basis is weak", a so-called 'constructive ambiguity' is often employed, giving different meanings to concepts (Jegen and Mérand, 2013).

In the context of this research, the decision-making process was defined in terms of agenda-setting: perception, justification, intention, and level of risk if the operation/mission. Decisions are justified according to either value-based or utility-based reasons. The former departs from the human security-oriented approach and encompasses the protection of civilians, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), among others. The latter involves the distinct material interests of EU member states (see Palm and Crum 2019).

Formulation has been defined in line with the mandate (the tasks established by the Council, robustness of the operations/missions, and their connection to other instruments), the type of operation, and the capacity/means to fulfill the stated policy, i.e. size (average number of personnel) and budget (financial resources allocated). The EU uses the term 'crisis management' to describe any action responding to a crisis at any point

during the cycle of conflict, and defines operations and missions as either civilian or military according to the mandate. Military operations require the deployment of military assets and troops. The number of personnel and assets deployed denotes that the perception and problem defined by the top decision-making body were commonly agreed upon by the member states and, in doing so, they committed themselves to provide the necessary means to accomplish the goals that were set. The number of personnel deployed fluctuates over time, making it difficult to specify the exact number of personnel present at any given time or over the course of the whole mission/operation. I used data provided by the EU's Global Engagement project and updated them until December 2019 based on EEAS factsheets and website information. Military operations are financed by the Athena Mechanism and member state contributions. The Mechanism covers approximately 10-15% of the total costs by collecting "common" or "shared" costs from all member states equally (Council of the EU 2011a). During the force generation conferences, member states make military contingents and/or enablers available and pay for their contributions based on the principle that 'costs lie where they fall'. While data on shared costs are often available, total costs are unknown. Operations are partially funded by national defence budgets, the figures for which are not always clear. I used data provided by the EU's Global Engagement project and updated the figures of each ongoing operation/mission until December 2019 based on Council decisions.

Implementation was evaluated according to number of participating countries and the speed with which they implemented the policy. The number of participating countries and speed of deployment can indicate compliance with and domestic consent to EU decisions, i.e. the level of political cohesion. The combined contribution of participating countries can indicate how much support there is behind EU decisions. Small contributions might indicate unwillingness to commit too heavily or spend resources on the operation. When a country's contribution is significantly higher than that of its peers, it may indicate that they 'assumed' the bulk of the operation due to specific national interests, and/or that other member states avoided becoming involved in the operation. The number of contributing countries fluctuates over time. Thus, I used data from the EU's Global Engagement project and updated them until December 2019 based on EEAS factsheets. Speed was measured according to the number of days between the time of the Council's decision to launch the operation/mission and its initial deployment. I used data from the EEAS factsheets, Council decisions, and other secondary sources.

Results were evaluated through the impact on the targeted actor(s), i.e. if the problem identified in mandates was resolved (short-term perspective), and if the operation produced an effect in the context in which it took place, i.e., change in behaviour (long-term perspective). The duration of the operation was also considered as it indicates both the EU's intention and the resolution to the problem. A short operation indicates the Union's intention to resolve specific problems in the short-term, while a longer operation can indicate the EU's intention to be more committed to the issue and the target country. However, it can also indicate that there were difficulties in accomplishing the mission (resolving the problem), making it necessary to extend the mandate. Duration was defined by the length of the operation in months from the initial deployment to its closure (ended operations/missions), or, until December 2019 (ongoing operations/missions).

Over the next sections, I present findings on the five stages of military operations/missions' implementation: input, decision making, output, outcome, and impact.

Inputs for EU military engagement

There is significant variation in the timing of military operations/missions launched by the EU so far. Six military operations were launched between 2003 and 2008 under Javier Solana, as High Representative, among which five were more robust: Artemis, Althea, Eufor RDC, Eufor Chad/RCA, and Eunavfor Somalia (hereinafter Operation Atalanta, or simply Atalanta). After Solana's departure in 2009, two operations (Eunavfor MED/Sophia and Eufor RCA) and four missions in Mali, Somalia, and Central African Republic were launched. This shows a drop in operations after Solana's era as efforts became less ambitious (Howorth 2011; Koutrakos 2013).

In terms of location, two operations were deployed in the Western Balkans and ten operations/missions in Africa. All operations involved an invitation, request, or approval from the host government. The motivation for establishing the operations varied. Concordia and Althea took over NATO operations Allied Harmony (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia — Fyrom, today the Republic of North Macedonia) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), respectively, and used its assets. Artemis and Eufor RDC, both in response to a UNSC request, were deployed on a temporary basis, the first to bridge UN reinforcement in the province of Ituri (UN 2003) and the second to enhance Monuc's rapid reaction capability in Kinshasa during the Congolese electoral process (EEAS 2007). Both operated in conjunction with the UN (Monuc). Eufor Chad/RCA was deployed as a bridge to the UN opera-

tion, Minurcat. In the Central African Republic (CAR), Eufor RCA came about following requests from the UNSC and the transitional government to secure the capital, allow French troops already in the country (Sangaris) to move beyond Bangui, and to support the UN deployment of Minusca. Following this, Eumam RCA and EUTM RCA were established in response to a request from the CAR government, and operated in cooperation with the UN (Minusca) (Aguilar 2019). EUTM Mali worked in cooperation with the UN (Minusma) as well as French forces deployed in the country (Barkhane) (EEAS 2016a). In the Horn of Africa, Atalanta and EUTM Somalia came following requests from the UN, the first in reaction to piracy that was affecting trade between Asia and Europe as well as a World Food Program (WFP) shipment to Somalia, and the second to assist Somali security forces in training and equipping themselves (UN 2009). Both operated in coordination with the Combined Task Forces and independent national units (e.g. from China, India, Japan Korea and Russia), as well as a UN/AU mission in Somalia, Amisom. Operation Sophia was established in response to the migration crisis in Europe to combat human smuggling/trafficking from Africa and the Middle East. It has since been extended to Libya to concentrate on upholding the UN arms embargo against Libya (EEAS 2019a). All these operations/missions were established as reactions to security crises (civil war, piracy, migration), including post conflict stabilisation scenarios for which they were tasked with contributing to peace agreement implementation or security sector reform. Table 1 summarises the context, motivations, and geographic scope in which the operations/missions were established.

Table 1
Input

Operation / Mission	Period	Context	Motivation	Geographic area
Concordia	2003	Post conflict	UNSC welcome- follow on NATO FYROM authorities invitation	Western Balkans (FYROM)
Artemis/DRC	2003	Civil war	UN request — bridge to UN In conjunction with UN (MONUC)	Subsahara DRC (Bunia)
Althea/BiH	2004- now	Post conflict	UNSC welcome- follow on NATO	Western Balkans (BiH)
Eufor DR Congo	2006	Civil war	UN request In conjunction with UN (MONUC)	Subsahara DRC (Kinshasa)
Eufor Chad/ RCA	2008- 2009	Security crisis	Bridge to UN (MINURCAT)	Subsahara East Chad/ Northeast RCA
EU NAVFOR — Atalanta	2008 — now	Counter piracy	UN request — In conjunction with Combined Task Force and independent national units	Horn of Africa
EUTM Somalia	2010 — now	Civil war	UN request In conjunction with UN–AU (Amisom)	Horn of Africa
EUTM-Mali	2013 — now	Civil war	Malian authorities invitation In conjunction with UN (Minusma)	Subsahara — Mali
Eufor RCA	2014 — 2015	Civil war	Bridge to AU (Misca) Transitional authorities invitation	Subsahara — RCA (Bangui)
Eumam RCA	2015 — 2016	Security crisis	Eufor RCA suggestion CAR authorities invitation in conjunction with UN (Minusca)	Subsahara — RCA
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	2015 — now	Migration crisis	EU interest In conjunction with NATO's Operation Sea Guardian	Mediterranean Libya
EUTM RCA	2016 — now	Security crisis	CAR authorities invitation In conjunction with UN (Minusca)	Subsahara — RCA

Source: The author

DECISION-MAKING AND REASONS FOR ENGAGING

Agenda setting highlighted considerable variation between the various military operations and missions. Operations in the Western Balkans were largely connected to the EU's interest in playing a more proactive role in security matters in its neighbourhood, its intention to initiate military operations, and opportunities to cooperate with NATO (Berlin Plus) and the UN. Artemis was built by the French government as an opportunity for the EU to launch an operation autonomous from NATO, as well as to test and showcase its capacity to do so (Gegout 2005). The same can be said of Eufor Chad/RCA and Eufor RCA, both of which aligned with French material interests in its former colonies. Eufor RDC and EUTM Somalia complied with EU-UN desires for closer cooperation (UN 2005). Operations/missions in Mali, the Horn of Africa, and the Mediterranean/Libya were established according to EU material perceptions (security, trade, migration, border security).

Justifications for the operations were largely value-based, with the exceptions of Atalanta, Sophia, and EUTM Mali (Palm and Crum 2019). However, a critical reading of the differences between justification and real intentions, or discourse and action, shows that despite the rhetoric of Council decisions — which indicate human objectives — most operations are embedded with distinct interests. Operations in the Western Balkans were mostly linked to the EU's intention of initiating its military interventions and taking the opportunity that came when NATO decide to close dawn its operations in the region. Artemis met the desire and opportunity to launch an independent operation — of short duration and limited scope — for testing, learning, and improving the EU's capacity to deploy operations, rather than to protect civilians and stabilise the humanitarian situation (see Council of the EU 2010). Eufor Chad/RCA and Eufor RCA were ultimately French projects taking place in former French colonies, despite attempts to justify the missions around human security (see Dijkstra 2010; Sourd 2008). Operations/missions have also been deployed according to EU trade interests (Horn of Africa cases), perceptions of threats (piracy, migration, terrorism, political instability, organised crime, etc.), and the need to keep such threats outside of Europe. Thus, there appears to be an overlap between utility-based decisions and value-based justifications.

Most operations were launched in permissive environments of relatively low risk. Concordia was deployed two years after the peak of violence in Fyrom, while Althea was deployed nine years after the end of the civil war in BiH. The four missions in Africa did not have executive tasks.

Naval operations have targeted pirates and traffickers/smugglers rather than direct conflict situations. Although Eufor RCA "took place under difficult circumstances" and "in a highly unstable environment" (Tardy 2015, 1), the operation was deployed after the peak of violence in the country, as was Eufor Chad/RCA. Artemis and Eufor RDC took place in a context of civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), however, their limited mandate, geographic scope and duration reduced the risks. EUTM Somalia was deployed in a country facing a complex and unstable security situation, however, the mission initially conducted training in Uganda and later was transferred to Somalia. Table 2 summarises the perceptions, justifications, intentions, and levels of risk involved in EU operations/missions.

Table 2
Decision-making

Operation / Mission	Perception	Justification (Council decisions)	Intention	Risk
Concordia	EU interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Low
Artemis/DRC	Member state interest	Value-based	Utility-based	High
Althea/BiH	EU interest	Value-based	Value-based	Low
Eufor DR Congo	EU interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Low
Eufor Chad/RCA	Member state interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Intermediate
EU Navfor — Atalanta	EU interest	Utility-based	Utility-based	Low
EUTM Somalia	EU interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Low
EUTM-Mali	EU interest	Utility-based	Utility-based	Low
Eufor RCA	Member state interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Intermediate
Eumam RCA	Member state interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Low
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	EU interest	Utility-based	Utility-based	Low
EUTM RCA	Member state interest	Value-based	Utility-based	Low

Source: The author

MILITARY OPERATION OUTPUTS: POLICY FORMULATION

Concordia and Althea were tasked with ensuring security and facilitating the implementation of peace agreements. In 2010, Althea's mandate included non-executive capacity-building and training support for the BiH authorities. In the DRC, Artemis was set to stabilise security conditions and improve the humanitarian situation in the city of Bunia (UN 2003), while Eufor RDC was tasked with supporting Monuc during the country's first round of presidential elections, from 30th July to 30th November, 2006 (UN 2006). Eufor Chad/RCA and Eufor RCA mandates encompassed the protection of civilians, delivery of humanitarian aid, and improvement of security (Council of the EU 2007; Council of the EU 2014a). Atalanta was established to protect vessels and bring to an end to acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros) (Council of the EU 2008; UN 2008a). Operation Sophia acted against migrant smugglers or traffickers in order to prevent the further loss of life at sea. In June 2016, the mandate included training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy and contributing to the implementation of UNSC resolutions that concerned Libya (an arms embargo and the illegal trafficking of oil exports) (EEAS 2019a).

The mandates of EUMAM RCA, EUTM Somalia, EUTM Mali, and EUTM RCA encompassed advisory and training tasks. All operations/missions were endorsed by UNSC resolutions. Table 3 presents the main objective of each operation/mission and its external endorsement.

Table 3
Mandates

Operation / Mission	Mandate	External endorsement
Concordia	To contribute to a stable secure environment and implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement.	UNSC resolution
Artemis/DRC	To contribute to the stabilization of security and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport and IDPs in the camps of Bunia, and to contribute to the safety of civilians, UN personnel, and humanitarian actors	UNSC resolution
Althea/BiH	To provide deterrence, continued compliance, and fulfil the role specified in the General Framework Agreement for Peace, and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH	UNSC resolution
Eufor DR Congo	To reinforce EUPOL Kinshasa during the electoral process, and to support an enhanced and coordinated response from PNC crowd control units in Kinshasa during the electoral period.	UNSC resolution
Eufor Chad/ RCA	To protect civilians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and ensure the safety of UN personnel in eastern Chad and the north-east of the Central African Republic	UNSC resolution
EU Navfor — Atalanta	To provide protection to WFP and merchant vessels, and deter, prevent, and intervene to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery	UNSC resolution
EUTM Somalia	To contribute to the training of Somali security forces	UNSC resolution
EUTM Mali	To contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces	UNSC resolution
Eufor RCA	To contribute to the provision of a safe and secure environment, with a handover to the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR), concentrating on the Bangui area.	UNSC resolution
Eumam RCA	To advice and support the preparation and implementation of Security Sector Reform	UNSC resolution
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	To support the detection and monitoring of migration networks, conduct boarding, search, seizure, and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking	UNSC resolution
EUTM RCA	To contribute to the Defence Sector Reform coordinated by MINUSCA, provide strategic advice to the Ministry of Defence, Military Staff, and Armed Forces, education to FACA officers, and training to the FACA.	UNSC resolution

Source: The author

Robust mandates are those that authorise the use of force. Low robustness refers to operations that explicitly limit or prohibit the use of force. Althea, Artemis, Eufor DRC, Eufor Chad/RCA, Eufor RCA, Atalanta, and Sophia were all authorised to use all necessary means to accomplish their mandates. Operation Concordia had a limited mandate as its troops would not deal with serious widespread incidents (Palm 2014). All military missions had non-executive mandates which excluded their involvement in combat. Althea and Concordia were embedded in a broader EU policy in the Western Balkans. Artemis and Eufor DRC related to broader EU involvement in the Great Lakes (see European Commission 2013). When Eufor Chad/RCA was created, the EU did not have a comprehensive strategy in the region. The same can be said of Atalanta. However, the operation motivated the EU to increase its involvement and in 2011 the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa was issued (Council of the EU 2011c), which connected both Atalanta and the following operation, EUTM Somalia. Operation Sophia was one element of a broader and more comprehensive EU response to the migration issue, which aimed to address both its physical components and root causes. The operations/missions in the CAR (Eumam, Eufor and EUTM) were "relatively isolated endeavours" that did "not crowd out non-military efforts" (Palm and Crum 2019, 526). EUTM Mali was included in the EU comprehensive strategy to the region of Sahel (see Council of the EU 2011b).

Military operations/missions focus on the implementation of peace agreements (Concordia and Althea), stabilisation (Artemis, Eufor Chad/RCA, Eufor RCA and Eufor RDC), counter piracy (Atalanta), combatting human smuggling/traffic, and strengthening Libya's capacity to deal with migration (Sophia); all missions focus on advisory/military assistance and training. Thus, these operations/missions have ranged from peacekeeping to post conflict stabilisation, the latter including prevention. The number of EU military personnel deployed ranged from 59 (Eumam RCA) to 7,000 (Althea BiH). In terms of size, only Althea can be considered a large operation at its starting date, while five can be classified as intermediate and six as small. The expenditure (common costs) varied from €4.7 million (Concordia) to €105.8 million (EUTM Mali). Consequently, I considered only two operations to be high cost (nearly €1 billion). Table 4 summarises the type, size, and budget of each operation/mission.

Table 4
Policy formulation

Operation / Mission	Mandate	Robustness	Link other instruments	Type	Size (total EU personnel)	Common costs
Concordia	Implementation of agreement (Limited executive tasks)	Low	Yes	Post conflict stabilisation	Small 400/313	Low €4.7 million
Artemis/ DRC	Stabilisation	High	Yes	Peacekeeping	Intermediate 1,807/1,807	Low €7 million
Althea/BiH	Implementation of agreement	High to Low	Yes	Post conflict stabilisation	Large (7,000) Intermediate (2,500) Small (600)	Intermediate €81.8 million
Eufor DR Congo	Stabilisation (Support response to violence)	High	Yes	Peacekeeping	Intermediate 2,259/2,259	Low €16.7 million
Eufor Chad/ RCA	PoC Deliver humanitarian aid	High	No	Peacekeeping	Intermediate 3,300/3,250	High €99.2 million
EU Navfor — Atalanta	Fight against piracy	High	No to Yes	Combat piracy	Intermediate 1,943/1,943	Intermediate €59.6 million
EUTM Somalia	Training Non-executive	Low	No Yes	Post conflict stabilisation	Small 125/121	Intermediate €60.9 million
EUTM-Mali	Training Non-executive	Low	Yes	Post conflict stabilisation	Small 570/465	High €105.9 million
Eufor RCA	Stabilisation	High	No	Peacekeeping	Small 700/531	Low €30.6 million
Eumam RCA	Advisory and training Non-executive	Low	No	Post conflict stabilisation	Small 70/59	Low €7.9 million
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	Fight against human smuggling/traffic	High	Yes	Combat human traffic	Intermediate 1,666/1,666	Low €18.9 million
EUTM RCA	Advisory and training Non-executive	Low	No	Post conflict stabilisation	Small 170/129	Low €43.6 million

Source: The author

MILITARY OPERATION OUTCOMES: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Participation ranged from six member states (Eumam RCA) to 26 member states (Sophia). Taking into account the highest recorded (or published) number of troops made available by each country, most contributions can be considered 'cosmetic', in other words, that countries provided very few troops compared to what they had available. In the period being discussed, France provided 43% of total personnel, Germany contributed more than 10%, three states have a record of participation between 5% and 10%, 12 states between 0.5% and 5%, and 11 states participated with less than 0.5% of the total.

Table 5
Contributing countries

Country	Number of operations	Percentage of total	Total personnel	Percentage of the total
Austria	9	7,5	591	4,24
Belgium	8	66,7	355	2,55
Bulgaria	3	25	123	0,88
Cyprus	2	16,7	3	0,02
Croatia	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	4	33,3	40	0,29
Denmark	0	0	0	0
Estonia	3	25	7	0,05
Finland	7	58,3	70	0,5
France	12	100	6.010	43,1
Germany	8	66,7	1.687	12,1
Greece	5	41,7	268	1,92
Hungary	7	58,2	188	1,35
Ireland	5	41,7	412	2,95
12 operations				
France	>43%	Germany	>10%	3 states

Country	Number of operations	Percentage of the total	Total personnel	Percentage of total
Italy	8	66,7	1.310	9,4
Latvia	3	25	44	0,32
Lithuania	4	33,3	5	0,03
Luxemburg	8	66,7	9	0,06
Malta	2	16,7	4	0,02
The Netherlands	6	50	132	0,95
Poland	8	66,7	750	5,38
Portugal	8	66,7	146	1,05
Romania	5	41,7	71	0,51
Slovakia	2	16,7	41	0,29
Slovenia	5	41,7	36	0,26
Spain	10	83,3	1.016	7,29
Sweden	9	75	495	3,55
The UK	6	50	127	0,91
13.940 personnel	12 states	<5% > 0,5%	11 states	< 0,5%

Source: The author.

The significantly disproportionate deployment of French personnel can be seen in seven operations/missions. In Artemis, 90.7% of troops were provided by France. France and Germany were also the main providers of troops to Eufor RDC (nearly 90%). Eufor Tchad/RCA was seen "as another pet project in support of *Françafrique"* (Dijkstra 2010, 396), with France providing 64.6% of the troops.

The speed of military operations varied from 24 days (Artemis DRC) to 157 days (Eufor RCA). Sometimes, the speed was related to what was negotiated by the principal agents, e.g., in the case of Althea, the date of the handover from NATO troops to the EU was previously agreed upon by the EU, US, NATO, and UN after a long negotiation (Dijkstra 2013). In other cases, speed was related to difficulties in the negotiation process, as member states presented different perceptions, interests, and degrees of willingness to spend resources on certain operations. Eufor Chad/RCA was created on 15 October 2007, however, it was almost a year before sufficient force were mobilised and its full operational capacity was achieved in September 2008 (see Mattelaer 2008), after the peak of violence in the region. Eufor RCA was established on the 10 February 2014, with a limited number of troops and scope. Rapid deployment was considered essential in order to allow French troops already deployed in Bangui to move from the capital towards the Western parts of the country (Council of the EU 2014a). Furthermore, the EU had already declared the full operational capacity of the Battle Groups in 2007. However, the EU force generation process failed to gather a sufficient number of troops and the necessary logistic support quickly enough, despite the efforts of the EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton towards European governments (Nimark 2014). On the 1 April 2014, Eufor RCA was officially set in motion and only reached its full operational capacity on 15 June (Törö 2015). The rapid deployment of troops to Artemis was only possible because of the French government's commitment to leading the operation and providing the bulk of its personnel. The deployment of EUFOR RDC met considerable delays because only Germany was able to offer the HQ facilities to lead a multinational force and there was some uneasiness around aspects of the operation in Berlin, such as the deployment of German troops abroad and the potential national agenda of some EU states towards the DRC and Central Africa (Tull 2009). Table 6 summarises the level of participation of EU members, and the speed of implementation of the operations/missions.

Table 6
Policy implementation

Operations / Mission	EU contributing countries / Total EU members	Unequal deployment	Speed (days)
Concordia	13/15	France 145/313 (46.3%)	50
Artemis/DRC	11/15	France 1,639/1,807 (90.7%)	24
Althea/BiH	21/25		136
Eufor DR Congo	17/25	France 975/2,259 (43.2%) Germany 745/2,259 (46.3%)	95
Eufor Chad/RCA	5/25	France 2,100/3,250 (64.6%)	153
EU Navfor — Atalanta	19/27		28
EUTM Somalia	13/27	Spain 38/121 (31.4%) France 25/121 (20.7%)	51
EUTM-Mali	19/28	France 207/465 (44.5%)	38
Eufor RCA	11/28	France 250/531 (47.1%)	71
Eumam RCA	6/28	Spain 22/59 (37.3%) France 20/59 (33.9%)	91
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	26/28		35
EUTM RCA	7/28	France 80/129 (62.1%)	88

Source: The author

REAL POLICY RESULTS AND IMPACT

Analysing results in terms of 'success' would imply vast efforts to define the parameters of the concept, which is not the aim of this paper. I argue that EU crisis management is mostly conceived of as a short-term endeavour to target an urgent situation, rather than a means for addressing the root causes of a 'problem'. Consequently, I looked at the duration of the operations/missions, whether they accomplished their mandate, and, in cases of longer operations, whether they changed behaviours, i.e. whether they cooperated with local groups to ensure better management of future disputes. The duration of concluded military operations ranged from two months (Artemis) to 181 months (Althea). Concordia accomplished the mandate, which was extended until 15 December 2003 after request from Macedonian authorities. Artemis was closed down on 1st September when responsibility for the security of Bunia was handed over to the MONUC after decreasing the intensity of the conflict.

Graphic 2 — Number of deaths in Bunia, DRC, including the period of the deployment of Artemis.
Souce: The data is drawn from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Acled), https://www.acleddata.com/data/, 01/02/2020.

Operation Althea is still ongoing and its short-term objectives to maintain a secure environment and strengthen local capacity building have been achieved. Alongside Monuc, Eufor RDC contributed to securing the election process and containing the potential spread of violence, although there were a limited the number of incidents. It demonstrated the capacity to react rapidly when necessary, e.g. during clashes between candidates' supporters between the 20th and 22nd of August (Aguilar 2019). Eufor Chad/RCA was deployed from 28 January 2008 in Eastern Chad and in the North East of the CAR, and ended on the 15 March 2009 (UN 2008b). The EEAS presented the operation as a success (see EU 2016c), however, it received criticism for having improvised certain response actions, where some troops were not prepared to confront the banditry at the heart of the insecurity in Eastern Chad, while others, concentrated in towns, failed to address core security challenges (The Global 2009). Despite critiques, the operation did manage to decrease the level of violence within its area of responsibility, with the exception of a short period in June 2008, as shown in Graphic 3.

Graphic 3 — Number of deaths in the Northeast of the CAR and Eastern Chad, including the period of the deployment of Eufor.
Source: The data is drawn from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Acled), https://www.acleddata.com/data/, 01/02/2020.

Atalanta showed progressive effectiveness. While there were 736 hostages and 32 ships held by pirates in 2011, no hostages or commandeered ships were recorded in October 2016, with 100% of WFP and Amison shipments successfully protected (EEAS 2019b). Eufor RCA had a robust mandate, however, it was limited to two districts as well as the airport of Bangui, and the mission's strength was modest (Törö 2015). According to Tardy (2015, 2), "it has contributed to the stabilisation of the situation in its area of deployment", and troops were "able to respond in line with its robust mandate" when tested. However, Bangui suffered large-scale human rights violation, violent groups were not disarmed, and many trouble spots remained (Tardy 2015). The operation was extended for a further period of four months and was closed down on 15 March 2015.

Graphic 4 — Number of deaths in the Bangui region, including the period of the deployment of Eufor.
Source: The data is drawn from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (Acled), https://www.acleddata.com/data/, 01/02/2020.

Advisory and training missions in the CAR, Mali, and Somalia played an active role in supporting military authorities in the design and development of 'new' security apparatus. However, these missions remain in the short-term category, despite aiming for long-term results. In its first year, Operation Sophia decreased the number of new migrants flowing into Italy by close to 4,000, compared to the same period in the previous year (Republic of Estonia 2017). However, Johansen (2017) illustrated that in almost the same period the operation contributed little to the formal objective of disrupting and dismantling human smuggling networks in the Central Mediterranean and, in some areas, it even had an adverse effect on this objective. The limited geographic scope and short duration of the operation did not permit them to fully address the root causes of the conflict. Consequently, and despite short-term results, these missions have not significantly changed behaviour in the host countries. Only Althea achieved a certain level of behavioural change as it successfully supported the cre-

ation of a 'new' multi-ethnic national army in the BiH. Table 7 summaris-
es the findings regarding results.

Table 7
Policy results

Operation / Mission	Duration (months)	Problem resolved?	Behavioural change	Remarks
Concordia	9	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate
Artemis/DRC	2	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate Insecurity remained in Eastern DRC
Althea/BiH	181	Yes	Intermediate	Ongoing — Long duration New multiethnic armed forces Little political breakthrough
Eufor DR Congo	4	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate Insecurity remained in the DRC
Eufor Chad/ RCA	12	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate Insecurity remained in Chad and CAR
EU Navfor — Atalanta	133	Yes	No	Ongoing Operation does not address root causes
EUTM Somalia	107	Yes	No	Ongoing — Limited mandate Mission addresses one root cause Insecurity remains in Somalia
EUTM-Mali	83	Yes	No	Ongoing — Limited mandate Mission addresses one root cause Insecurity remains in Mali
Eufor RCA	12	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate Insecurity remains in the CAR
Eumam RCA	16	Yes	No	Short duration — Limited mandate Mission addresses one root cause Insecurity remained in the CAR
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	54	Yes	No	Ongoing Operation addresses some root causes
EUTM RCA	42	Yes	No	Ongoing — Limited mandate Mission addresses one root cause Insecurity remains in the CAR

Source: The author

THE TRUE NATURE OF EU MILITARY OPERATIONS: CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

EU discourse claims that its "approach to security and defence lies precisely in this careful mix between targeted civilian and military actions: this is what makes the European Union such a unique security player in the world" (Mogherini 2017, 5). The EU has launched more civilian missions than military operations/missions.

Hughes argues that "the Union views itself as a normatively motivated organization that embodies a 'community of peace and progress'", which resulted "its role as being endowed with the moral responsibility to act multilaterally with the international community […] to prevent the human suffering and destruction caused by violent conflicts" (Hughes 2009, 279). However, military interventions can also be seen as mechanisms for the EU to acquire greater political weight in international politics, rather than for promoting and defending universal values. Moreover, EU military operations/missions are mostly established to secure Europe. All EU military operations/missions carried out between 2003 and 2020 were in the Western Balkans and Africa. In 2016, the HR/VP Federica Mogherini emphasised that the EU's strategic autonomy meant first and foremost the ability to take care of the security of Europe "for which we are called to take more responsibility in our own interest — not because somebody else asked" and the responsibility and opportunity "to use the European way to security in our region for our own interest and for the interest of the rest of the world" (EEAS 2016b).

Operations/missions were more often set in motion on request of other international organisations (mainly the UN) than the EU's own goal to engage preventively against human suffering. Some missions were motivated by or linked to previous EU operations, e.g. in Somalia and CAR. Moreover, Concordia and Althea utilised troops from European countries that had already been deployed in the context of NATO operations.

Conflict prevention became "one of the main objectives of the EU's external relations" (Council of the EU 2001). However, most operations (if not all) were launched in reaction to security crises (e.g. Horn of Africa and Mediterranean), either during civil war (e.g. in the DRC and Mali), in its aftermath (e.g. in the CAR), or years later (e.g. Concordia and Althea).

The EU appears to be a rather risk-averse military actor. Most operations were deployed in a low-risk context. Even when they were deployed in very unstable environments (e.g. in the CAR, Mali, Eastern DRC and Somalia), their limited mandates, geographic scope, size, and duration de-

creased the risks. Within the closed operations, those with the highest risk did not last for more than 13 months.

There was significant overlap between utility-based and value-based approaches, suggesting that despite discourse surrounding the EU's normative power, in practice, most operations were more closely aligned to the realistic conception of the EU's global power and security interests, rather than values of human security.

The operations/missions undertaken by the EU were mostly small/intermediate and low cost. Even if the biggest operation (Althea) began with 7,000 troops, its scale was shortly and sharply reduced to 2,500 troops in 2007 and to 600 troops in 2012.

There appears to be an interconnection between perception/interest and speed. Quick deployments were the result of collective agreements on the need for rapid reaction (Sophia), taking advantage of opportunities (Concordia), or the efforts of an interested member state (Artemis). Perceptions that certain operations were the personal projects of a particular member state resulted in difficulties obtaining the necessary means, which delayed the speed of deployments (e.g. Eufor Chad/RCA and Eufor RCA).

Combining perceptions/justifications, contribution by country (both overall and for individual operations), unequal deployment, and speed, it can be established whether levels of cohesion, and the data indicate they are low or intermediate.

Table 8 — Level of cohesion

Operation / Mission	EU contributing Countries High < 35% of total EU members Intermediate > 35% < 70% of total EU members Low > 70% of total EU members	Unequal deployment High < 35% of total personnel Intermediate > 35% < 70% of total personnel Low > 70% of total personnel	Speed Low < 60 days Intermediate > 60 < 120 days High > 120 days	Cohesion
Concordia	High	Intermediate	Low	High
Artemis/DRC	High	High	Low	Intermediate
Althea/BiH	High	Low	High	High
Eufor DR Congo	Intermediate	High	Intermediate	Intermediate
Eufor Chad/RCA	Low	Intermediate	High	Low
EU Navfor — Atalanta	High	Low	Low	High
EUTM Somalia	Intermediate	Intermediate	Low	Intermediate
EUTM-Mali	Intermediate	Intermediate	Low	Intermediate

Eufor RCA	Intermediate	Intermediate	Intermediate	Intermediate
Eumam RCA	Low	High	Intermediate	Low
Eunavfor MED — Sophia	High	Low	Low	High
EUTM RCA	Low	Intermediate	Intermediate	Low

Source: The author

Decisions and their implementation lie with the member states, mainly in the hands of the most powerful (especially the "big three"). When Germany and the UK had reservations about getting involved in certain operations, France virtually assumed the responsibility. Operations/missions presented short-term results. In general, they accomplish the mandates but do not address (or only marginally address) the root causes of conflict. To date, no operation/mission has changed behaviours in the host countries.

The central focus of this paper was the practice of EU military operations/missions, the intention being to understand the true nature of the Union's military interventions. The EU's identification as a largely civilian rather than purely military actor provides it with the structural ability to deal with conflicts, with peace operations/missions being just one part of the way the EU wants to work in the world. The EU has made notable efforts in improving its military capabilities to react to crises. Notwithstanding, the results are questionable, i.e. there is a mismatch between what the EU says it will do, and its concrete action in practice. In 2007, Solana highlighted that the concept of battle groups was "not just a concept but already a reality", a capacity that was "at the heart of the EU's ability to act quickly and robustly where needed" (Solana 2007). However, they have never seen action and enthusiasm for them waning (EU CSDP 2013). In general, military actions have focused on small operations/missions of short duration, low cost, and short-term results.

Certain operations/missions were established to test and/or prove the EU's capacity to act autonomously, while others were seen as a particular member State's project (Gegout 2005; Griffin 2007), a "cosmetic operation" (Haine and Giegerich 2006) or as a 'bridge' to more complex operations (Tardy 2015). Some military operations faced resistance from EU members who were reluctant to engage, which made the mobilisation of forces difficult. Authors have pointed out that operations "did not demonstrate any major advances in EU military capacities for active engagement" (Griffin 2007, 40) and that political expectations did not match the military capacity of forces involved nor the range of obstacles that were confronted on the ground (Murphy 2011).

An initial impetus is perceived during the Solana era (1999-2009), which can be linked with his past as Secretary General of NATO. Similarly to the way he drove the organisation into such polemic interventions as Kosovo (1999), Solana led the EU into more proactive role during the first decade of the CSDP. The years following his leadership demonstrated a retraction in operations, the causes for which will be addressed in future research, as was the intention of this paper. In conclusion, the EU intends to work cohesively (internally), to partner with others (outside Europe), and to be perceived as a relevant and indispensable actor. However, member states' preferences, capacities, and political (un)willingness to commit resources can undermine cohesion, which in turn harms the outcomes (policy implementation) and impact. In such a way, EU military operations appear more like aspirations than as concrete projections of Europe's ability to act as a big player in global security environment.

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EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY OPERATIONS AND GLOBAL SECURITY: AMBITIONS AND REALITY

ABSTRACT

Over the last twenty years, the European Union (EU) has made notable efforts to improve its ability to react militarily to crises. The Union has launched crisis management missions and operations with the aim of playing a more relevant role in the field of international security. To date, thirteen military operations and missions have been established as part of its overseas activity. Notwithstanding, the results are questionable; there is a mismatch between what the EU says and its concrete action in practice. This paper aims to paint a more in-depth and realistic picture of the situation, arguing that although ambitions are high, the Union's military interventions are still limited. The paper is descriptive-exploratory; it lays the groundwork for further analytical research on EU military operations and missions by describing the phenomenon and its key features. I use some proxies to generate quantitative and qualitative data from primary and secondary sources, and combine them to demonstrate how EU perceptions and intentions have been translated into effective implementation. The paper concludes that EU military operations appear more like aspirations than as concrete projections of Europe's ability to act as a big player in global security environment.

Keywords: European Union; Military Operations; Crisis Management; Peace Operations.

RESUMO

Nos últimos vinte anos, a União Europeia (UE) desenvolveu esforços notáveis para melhorar a sua capacidade de reação militar às crises. A UE lançou missões e operações de gestão de crises com o objetivo de desempenhar um papel mais relevante no domínio da segurança internacional. Até o momento, foram criadas treze operações e missões militares no âmbito da sua atividade externa. No entanto, os resultados são questionáveis; existe uma defasagem entre o que a UE diz e a sua ação concreta na prática. O artigo tem por objetivo traçar um quadro mais aprofundado e realista da situação, argumentando que, embora as ambições sejam elevadas, as intervenções militares da União continuam a ser limitadas. O documento é descritivo-exploratório; estabelece as bases para uma investigação analítica mais aprofundada sobre as operações e missões militares da UE, descrevendo o fenômeno e as suas principais características. Utilizo alguns indicadores para gerar dados quantitativos e dados qualitativos a partir de fontes primárias e secundárias, combinando-os para demonstrar como as percepções e intenções da UE se traduziram numa implementação efetiva. O documento conclui que as operações militares da UE parecem mais com aspirações do que como projeções concretas da capacidade da Europa para atuar como um ator importante no ambiente de segurança global.

Palavras chave: União Europeia; operações militares; gerenciamento de crise; operações de paz