A Clausewitzian Theory Analysis of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War

Abstract

Is it possible to employ key precepts and concepts of the Clausewitzian theory of
war, present in On War (1989), to understand a twenty-first century war, which
occurred outside the European geographic space, in its multiple characteristics
and complexities? From this question-problem, the object of the research goes
through the Hezbollah-Israel conflict, which occurred between July and August
2006. Our hypothesis is that Clausewitz’s key concepts remain current and, despite
temporal limitations, are amenable to being employed to analyze the specificities
of this conflict in screen. Thus, as a central objective, this will be analyzed from
Clausewitz’s theoretical-conceptual prism, present in On War (1989), focusing on
the conceptions of: political objectives; limited and unlimited warfare; political,
strategic, and tactical attackers and defenders; advantage of waiting and position;
and deterrence, without the neologisms applied to war today. Drawing on historical-documentary research methods, in conjunction with case study techniques,
a historical overview is provided from the causes of the war, to how Israel and
Hezbollah developed and applied their political objectives, strategies, and tactics,
arriving, finally, at a brief final post-war assessment. It is concluded that the 2006
war, considering its specificities, transited between several Clausewitzian concepts.