Guerras sin victoria: por qué la superioridad militar de EEUU no garantiza el éxito estratégico

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v13i1.75541

Palabras clave:

estados unidos, poder militar, reduccionismo armamentista

Resumen

El desempeño militar de Estados Unidos en las últimas décadas evidencia una paradoja entre su extraordinaria capacidad bélica y su limitada eficacia para alcanzar victorias estratégicas. Aunque sus fuerzas armadas han demostrado una superioridad militar sin precedentes, conflictos como Vietnam, Irak, Afganistán e Irán, muestran que el dominio militar no garantiza el cumplimiento de los objetivos políticos que motivan el uso de la fuerza. El trabajo sostiene que esta brecha entre capacidades militares y resultados políticos responde a variables que exceden el potencial armamentista. El artículo examina cómo variables organizacionales, culturales y formativas condicionan la interacción entre la conducción política y las Fuerzas Armadas, dificultando tanto la definición de objetivos políticos como su consecución por parte del instrumento militar. El caso que se analiza es el de EEUU tanto por su constante participación en conflictos armados, como por la disponibilidad de fuentes primarias y secundarias. Este artículo aspira a ampliar una literatura que es escasa en América Latina y donde prevalece en los ámbitos militar y de académicos dedicados a la defensa y estudios estratégicos un reduccionismo armamentista que
tiende a limitar los debates en estos temas a la posesión de armamento.

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Biografía del autor/a

Jorge Battaglino, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella

es doctor y magíster en Política Latinoamericana por la Universidad de Essex y Licenciado en Ciencia Política de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Investigador Principal en el CONICET y profesor en la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Ha sido Rector de la Universidad de la Defensa Nacional y de la maestría y doctorado en Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Orcido.org/0000-0002-9399-7748. Correo electrónico: jbattaglino@utdt.edu. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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Publicado

2026-09-29

Cómo citar

Battaglino, J. (2026). Guerras sin victoria: por qué la superioridad militar de EEUU no garantiza el éxito estratégico. Revista Brasileira De Estudos De Defesa, 13(1), e026015,p. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v13i1.75541

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