Cards on the table: The Balance of Forces, Peace Negotiations, and the Future of the War in Ukraine
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v13i1.75513Keywords:
Guerra russo-ucraniana, Correlação de forças militares, Negociações de paz, RealismoAbstract
This article provides a current assessment of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which in 2026 reaches its fifth year. It seeks to answer the following question: what is the short-term prognosis regarding the end of the war in Ukraine, considering the balance of forces between the belligerents, their strategic objectives, and the state of diplomatic negotiations? Conceiving war as a means to achieve political ends, it is contended that Russia possesses a feasible theory of victory, while Ukraine finds itself in an increasingly difficult position. The observed military balance
indicates Russian advantages in key domains of attritional warfare: manpower, artillery, air power, and a defense industrial base capable of sustaining battlefield demands. Having not yet achieved these objectives, Putin retains incentives to maintain his current course of action and to reject a ceasefire. From a negotiating standpoint, Kyiv faces a weakened bargaining position due to battlefield setbacks and significant external pressure, particularly from the United States. Nevertheless, a peace agreement in the short term is considered unlikely, given the maximalist and incompatible positions of both actors, reinforced by mutual
distrust and a reluctance to make substantial concessions.
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