Guerra Híbrida: o emprego da tecnologia da informação no conflito Rússia-Ucrânia (2014-2015)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26792/rbed.v7n2.2020.75208Palabras clave:
Guerra Cibernética. Estratégia. Hacker. RussiaResumen
Como a tecnologia da informação amplia a assimetria de poder entre os Estados contemporâneos? Com o objetivo de responder ao questionamento, o artigo descreve o processo de utilização do ciberespaço para consecução dos objetivos estratégicos da Federação Russa em seu entorno regional, durante o conflito desencadeado com a Ucrânia (2014-2015). A partir da análise de relatórios de empresas especializadas em segurança cibernética e instituições governamentais, aplicamos as técnicas qualitativas da dependência da trajetória e rastreamento de processos para explicitar a complexidade das operações conjuntas entre as forças especiais russas e hackers civis, bem como a sofisticação das principais ameaças e armas utilizadas nos ataques cibernéticos. Desse modo, identificamos o mecanismo responsável por conectar os níveis estratégico, tático e operacional militar ao verificarmos o processo de ação simbiótica entre os atores envolvidos no conflito. As evidências coletadas indicam como a guerra híbrida empregada pela Federação Russa incorporou a dimensão cibernética como peça chave para a desestabilização de territórios e consecução de interesses em seu entorno estratégico.
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